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AUTHOR Chametzky, Robert A.
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ABSTRACT

The language arts are constructed like a doughnut or a bagel, so that at their center where there might be something, there is instead a hole--emptiness. The dominant approach to understanding the nature of language--generative grammar--does not suggest a center for the language arts. An alternative approach to language and mind is "cognitive linguistics" or "cognitive grammar." Mark Turner has outlined in a number of books a general approach to the study of language and literature based in cognitive linguistics which he calls "cognitive rhetoric." A common project in cognitive grammar is often the intensive investigation of the occurrences of a single word. A central goal of Turner is to reinvigorate the study of language and literature as grounded in human cognition. Turner pursues his project by means of illustrative cases. Turner suggests other levels beyond "local" investigations of words and imagery at which knowledge of the structure and system in everyday cognition can and should inform more strictly literary inquiries. At another level, Turner suggests that the study of genre should be rethought. Turner also sketches an analysis of tense (in English) as an example of how grammatical constructions can be explicated in this framework. These ideas can provide the sort of center for the language arts that is currently missing. (Contains 21 references.) (RS)

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Finding language in the language arts: towards "cognitive language arts"*

Robert A. Chametzky
Indiana University
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*A paper written as part of a program at the Indiana University School of Education for certification in teaching Secondary English . The author is a Visiting Scholar in the Department of Linguistics at Indiana University; his work in theoretical linguistics includes *A theory of phrase markers and the extended base* (SUNY Press 1996). Thanks to Professor Carl B. Smith of Indiana University and the ERIC Clearinghouse on Reading, English, and Communication for encouragment and help.

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The language arts lack a center. More accurately, the language arts are constructed like a doughnut or a bagel, so that at their center where there might be something, there is instead a hole--emptiness. The language arts comprise various ways to use language, various ways to become more skilled in various ways to use language, various ways in which various ways to use language might improve various other skills or capacities; amidst such variousness, one might seek unity. It is by putting language at their center that the language arts could achieve unity. This means grounding the language arts in the study of the nature of language; it means understanding that the nature of language is *prior to* and informs, guides, and shapes ways of using language, becoming more skillful in ways of using language, and using language to develop other skills.

The dominant approach to understanding the nature of language--generative grammar--does not suggest a center for the language arts. Generative grammar argues that the nature of language is *sui generis*; language is a "mental organ" or a special purpose instinct (Pinker 1994; Jackendoff 1994). The principles which govern it do not ramify, not even to uses of language. There are, however, other approaches to the nature of language which are both viable within linguistics proper and which do potentially ramify in the desired way.

One such alternative approach to language and mind is that called "cognitive linguistics" or "cognitive grammar" (see, e.g., Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Fauconnier 1985, Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1987, Langacker 1987, Sweetser 1990, Johnson 1993, Fauconnier & Sweetser 1996, to mention only books). Mark Turner has outlined in a number of books a general approach to the study of language and literature based in cognitive linguistics, one that he calls "cognitive rhetoric" (see Turner 1987, 1991, 1996, Lakoff & Turner 1989, Thomas & Turner 1994). We shall examine Turner's project as basis for developing a center for the language arts. We begin, however, with cognitive linguistics, the foundations of cognitive rhetoric.

Cognitive linguistics is itself part of a Big Idea (the Bigness is most on view in Lakoff 1987). This Big Idea is that the way the human mind is typically understood within most contemporary cognitive science (viz., linguistics, philosophy, psychology, computer science) is wrong, and wrong in very deep and fundamental ways. Therefore, this work often comes with both "a negative and a positive aspect . . . ." (Lakoff 1988: 150); the negative aspect being the

argument against the usual view, the positive aspect being the elaboration of an alternative. We shall skip the negative aspect, along with it any specification of the usual view, and move instead directly to the positive aspect. One name sometimes used for (one strand in) cognitive linguistics is *experiential cognition* (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987)

> The theory of experientialist cognition posits:
> --Concepts of two sorts that are meaningful because of their roles in bodily experience (especially movement and perception):
> 1. Basic-level concepts . . .
> 2. Image-schemas (e.g., containers, paths, links, part-whole schemas, force-dynamic schemas, etc.). These have a nonfinitary internal structure.
>
> --Imaginative processes for forming abstract cognitive models from these: Schematization Metaphor, Metonymy, and Categorization.
> --Basic cognitive processes such as focusing, scanning, superimposition, figure-ground shifting, vantage-point shifting, etc.
> --Mental spaces. . . .
>
> The central claim of experientialist cognition is:
> --Meaningful conceptual structures arise from two sources:
> (1) from the structured nature of bodily and social experience and
> (2) from our innate capacity to imaginatively project from certain well-structured aspects of bodily and interactional experience to abstract conceptual structures.
> Rational thought is the application of very general cognitive processes--focusing, scanning, superimposition, figure-ground reversal, etc.--to such structures. (Lakoff 1988: 121)

Evidently, there is a great deal here to be explicated. We shall attempt only a part of this work. In the domain of linguistics proper

> --Experientialist cognition sees the syntax of a language as
> 1. providing grammatical categories and constructions that are semantically-motivated,
> 2. giving the semantic and functional motivations for those categories and constructions, and
> 3. indicating the relations among the constructions--relationships based both on form and on meaning.
>
> Each grammatical construction is a form-meaning pairing with the structure of a cognitive model. Constructions are combined by superimposition and sentences are processed by general cognitive processes. (Lakoff 1988: 122)

Here, too, there is plenty to be explicated. And again, we shall not be exhaustive. Crucial to the experientialist program--and to its name--is the proposition that much about meaning, hence thought, hence language, can only be understood by understanding that "[o]ur reality is shaped by the patterns of our bodily movement, the contours of our spatial and temporal orientation, and the forms of our interaction with objects." (Johnson 1987: xix) In other words, meaning arises out of the nature of our physical, bodily nature and the interactions of that body with other objects in the

world. The nature of our embodiment itself structures meaning through "certain kinaesthetic image-schemas" (Lakoff 1988: 140) These "(image-)schemas" are not propositional, are not general knowledge structures, and are not scripts, as in most contemporary approaches to schemata (Johnson 1987: 19-20) . Rather, "image schemata operate at a level of mental organization that falls between abstract propositional structures, on the one side, and particular concrete images, on the other." (Johnson 1987: 29) The argument is that

> . . . in order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences that we can comprehend and reason about, there must be pattern and order to our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. *A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of, these ongoing ordering activities.* These patterns emerge as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our bodily movements through space, our manipulation of objects, and our perceptual interactions. (Johnson 1987: 29; emphasis in original)

Lakoff (1988: 141-144) briefly characterizes four such schemata: *The CONTAINER Schema*; *The PART-WHOLE Schema*; *The LINK Schema*; and *The SOURCE-PATH-GOAL Schema.* With respect to the CONTAINER schema, he notes that "[w]e understand our own bodies as containers--perhaps the most basic things we do are ingest and excrete, take air into our lungs and breathe it out." (Lakoff 1988: 140) He explicates this schema as follows:

> The CONTAINER Schema
> *Bodily experience*: As Johnson points out, we experience our bodies both as containers, and as things in containers (e.g., rooms) constantly.
> *Structural elements*: INTERIOR, BOUNDARY, EXTERIOR
> *Basic Logic*: Like most image-schemas, its internal structure is arranged so as to yield a basic "logic". Everything is either inside a container or out of it--P or not P. If container A is in container B and X is in A, then X is in B--which is the basis for modus ponens: If all A's are B's and X is an A, then X is a B. This is the basis for the Boolean logic of classes.
> *Sample Metaphors*: The visual field is understood as a container: things *come into* and *go out of sight*.. Personal relationships are also understood in terms of containers: one can be *trapped in a marriage* and *get out of it.*
>
> The "basic logic" of image-schemas is due to their configurations as gestalts--as structured wholes which are more than mere collections of parts. Their basic logic is a consequence of their configurations. (Lakoff 1988: 141)

In discussing this schema, Johnson (1987: 30) notices the many and various "*in-out* orientations" that might happen in even a short span of time at the start of a day.

> You wake *out* of a deep sleep and peer *out* from beneath the covers *into* your room. You gradually emerge *out* of your stupor, pull yourself *out* from under the covers, climb *into* your robe, stretch *out* your limbs, and walk *in* a daze *out* of the bedroom and *into* the

> bathroom. You look *in* the mirror and see your face staring *out* at you. You reach *into* the medicine cabinet, take *out* the toothpaste, squeeze *out* some toothpaste, put the toothbrush *into* your mouth, brush your teeth *in* a hurry, and rinse *out* your mouth.

The inventory goes on, but the point is that "Johnson is not merely playing on the words *in* and *out*. There is a reason that those words are natural and appropriate, namely, the fact that we conceptualize an enormous number of activities in CONTAINER terms." (Lakoff 1988: 140) And this leads to a crucial claim of cognitive linguistics: the existence of "systematic polysemy". That is, cognitive linguistics says that the use of what appears to be a single word in many contexts with many meanings--perhaps so many and so different that we suspect it is not in fact a single word, that we have homonymy, not polysemy--is something than can be analyzed and explained, and analyzed and explained in such a way that the polysemy hypothesis is vindicated.

So, a common project in cognitive grammar is often the intensive investigation of the occurrences of a single word (or some small set of related words, as above), attempting to account for these occurrences by adverting to a small number of basic kinaesthetic image-schemata and their metaphorical extensions into other domains by means of common bodily activities such as scanning, figure-ground shifting, and the like. Underlying this investigation is a four-part argument (Lakoff 1988: 144), which argument is substantiated to the degree that convincing cognitive linguistic analyses are forthcoming.

> --Image-schemas structure our experience preconceptually.
> --Corresponding image-schematic concepts exist.
> --There are metaphors mapping image-schemas into abstract domains, preserving their basic logic.
> --The metaphors are not arbitrary, but are themselves motivated by structures inhering in everyday bodily experience.

Perhaps equally important to cognitivist linguistics is its approach to *categories* and *categorization*. The view is essentially a version and elaboration of *prototype* theory (see Smith & Medin 1981 and Lakoff 1987 for summary, discussion, and references to the crucial work by Wittgenstein and Eleanor Rosch). On this view, categories are not determined by definitions consisting of necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, categories have prototypes--abstract central cases, more or less--likeness to which along various dimensions determines membership in the category for candidates. Categories may then be understood as *radial* (Lakoff 1987) in the sense that different dimensions go off from the prototype in "different directions", and candidates

for membership may be closer on one dimension and farther on another, relative to one another. Moreover, categorization itself has something like a prototype structure, with a distinguished *basic level* for categories. Such categories are "basic in four respects" according to Lakoff (1987: 133):

> *Perception*: Overall perceived shape; single mental image; fast identification
> *Function*: General motor programs; general cultural functions.
> *Communication*: Shortest, most commonly used and contextually neutral words, learned by children and first to enter the lexicon.
> *Knowledge Organization*: Most attributes of category members are stored at this level.

As examples, Lakoff contrasts *cat* and *table* with *animal* and *furniture*. We have general mental images for each of the former pair, while "there is no single mental image that covers" such superordinate categories as in the latter pair. Similarly, "we have no motor programs for using furniture in general . . . ." while we do have motor programs for using tables.

Cognitive linguists do not deal exclusively with words and word meaning, however. As noted, they also treat grammatical constructions, and "the grammar represents an inventory of form-meaning-function complexes, in which words are distinguished from grammatical constructions only with regard to their internal complexity." (Michaelis & Lambrecht 1996: 216; see also Pullum & Zwicky 1991; Zwicky 1994; Goldberg 1995) Prototype organization is also found in the realm of constructions, complete with "basic-level constructions" (such as the subject-predicate construction) (Michaelis & Lambrecht 1996: 218). So, despite the fact that it appears to have a quite distinct domain--"[a]mong the formal objects represented by constructions are linking constructions (e.g., the ditransitive), sentence-type constructions (e.g., topicalization), instantiation constructions (e.g., templates for null instantiation and coinstantiation of arguments), and constituency constructions (e.g., verb phrase) . . . ." (Michaelis & Lambrecht 1996: 217--cognitive grammar syntax is in fact very much of a piece with the sorts of intensive word-based investigations noted above. Indeed, it is part of the overall project to claim that constructions--syntactic patterns--have themselves "an inherent semantics" (Michaelis & Lambrecht 1996: 220) and so can--indeed must--be studied as a "simultaneous representation of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties" (Michaelis & Lambrecht 1996: 219) in the manner cognitive linguistics allows--indeed requires. With this much by way of preliminary preliminaries, we can turn to the main preliminary, Turner's cognitive rhetoric, in preparation for the main event itself--the "cognitive language arts".

We shall deal with three of Turner's works: *Reading minds* (1991; hereafter RM); *Clear and simple as the truth* (1994, jointly written with Francis-Noel Thomas; hereafter CST), and *The literary mind* (1996; hereafter LM). Our first item is why "cognitive rhetoric"?

It is *cognitive* because Turner explicitly makes his project continuous with the sorts of inquiries we have just adumbrated (e.g., RM: 20-22). A central goal is "to reintegrate the study of language and literature as grounded in human cognition . . ." (RM: 24) And the ground for this is a view that takes "literary language as continuous with common language, and meaning as tied to conventional conceptual structures that inform both common and literary language in a continuous and systematic manner." (RM: 18) Ultimately the position developed is one that appears to reverse the foundations:

> The literary mind is the fundamental mind. . . .*Story* is a basic principle of mind. . . . Parable [in a technical sense meaning "the projection of one story onto another"--RC] is the root of the human mind--of thinking, knowing, acting, creating, and plausibly even of speaking." (LM: v)
>
> If we want to study the everyday mind, we can begin by turning to the literary mind exactly because the everyday mind is essentially literary. (LM: 7)
>
> The processes of the literary mind are usually considered to be different from and secondary to the processes of the everyday mind. On that assumption, the everyday mind--with its stable concepts and literal reasoning--provides the beginnings for the (optional) literary mind. On the contrary, processes that we have always considered to be literary are at the foundation of the everyday mind. (LM: 115)

But even with this apparent reversal, there is no reason to give up the sorts of cognitive linguistics inquiries adumbrated above. Indeed, it is logically the case that is only by doing analyses of both literary and everyday language that an inherently relational claim such as that in the quotes can be supported (or refuted). The underlying claim remains the same: on account of the continuity between literary language/mind and everyday language/mind, inquiry into one can--and must--inform any inquiry into the other; to pursue either in isolation is perforce to fail.

The project is *rhetoric* in a sense that is no longer common (RM: 29):

> Classical rhetoricians sought to discover the basic conceptual apparatus active in the minds of citizens, and upon which nearly every aspect of their thinking, their language, and their society is based. Over subsequent centuries, classical rhetoric degenerated into tabulating taxonomies of mannered wordplay and memorizing categories of argument. Our present concept of rhetoric is equally degenerate. . . . This book . . . offers a conception of the humanities that is a direct continuation of the classical paradigm, however differently that paradigm may play out in the age of cognitive science.

We can see, then that it is exactly its contemporary cognitive nature that allows the project to be classically rhetorical. It is just because the inquiry involves uncovering such general and far-reaching properties of human mental life that it can claim to stand as a continuation of classical rhetoric. Indeed, it is only an inquiry such as cognitive linguistics and experiential semantics that could ground the possible rehabilitation of the project of classical rhetoric--whether the literary or the linguistic/everyday mind is ultimately primary is, for this purpose at least, of no significance. It might, indeed, be more appropriate to use *cognitive rhetoric* as the most general term for such inquiries, with *cognitive linguistics* as that subtype that inquires into questions most continuous with those of the linguistics tradition, as pointed to above.

Turner pursues his project by means of illustrative cases. Inevitably, such a project must get down to cases, to specific analyses, if it is to be at all convincing, or, more to the point, encouraging. The purpose of announcing a new research agenda can be at least as much to offer a promising and fruitful approach for others as it is to display virtuoso performances by oneself. Careers may be made with just the latter, but "paradigm shifts" cannot be. Turner examines

> . . .arresting poetic uses of metaphor, complicated symmetries in elite texts, fine points in the rhetoric of rational argument, and provocative assertions of imaginative conceptual connection. In each case, we have seen that the remarkable and special phenomenon is the tip of the iceberg. Our attempt to analyze these remarkable and special acts of language and literature has driven us to analyze the incomparably larger and more interesting background conceptual system that makes them possible. The true intricacy and power lie with this background system. We have seen special moments constituted as exploitations of this conceptual system. We have seen how special moments, embedded within this background conceptual system, are thereby anchored in our everyday embodied knowledge of image-schemas, event shapes, bodily symmetry, force dynamics, category structures, and the rest of the everyday mind. To count as analysis, a treatment of these special moments must explain what is special about them in terms of the underlying basic forms of knowledge. The analysis of the special must start and end with the analysis of the everyday. (RM: 151)

A simple instance of this sort of analysis is the following example (RM: 133-35). Why do we understand these "four exemplary cases" differently? It is readily understood that the first three are to be taken as "analogies" [a technical term for Turner that covers "all cases in which we understand one concept in terms of another concept, to any degree or by any process" (RM: 121)], while the fourth is very difficult to understand this way. The first three, moreover, differ as to how easily, if at all, the analogy they propose to us is to be comprehended.

--A man is a rock.
--A child is a light bulb.
--A chicken is a fence.
--A steno chair is a rocking chair.

To explain the first cut, between the fourth and the other three, Turner invokes the notion of "basic-level" category. Analogies "equate mental models that are at the basic level." But the fourth example does not do this; *steno chair* and *rocking chair* are in fact "concepts that share a supercategory at the basic level." Thus, though there are any number of distinctions between these two sorts of chairs, they partake of the same basic-level mental model, that for *chair*. The point of an analogy is that it suggests we should create a new category from the basic-level mental models in the equating statement; but when the terms already share a basic-level mental model, "we believe that there already exists a wealthy and powerful category capturing the useful connections." The same explanation holds for such examples as the following.

--A 2-by-4 is a 4-by-4
--Parsley is cumin
--A mug is a tumbler
--A daisy is a petunia

The differences among the other three examples are a result of the conventionality of the analogies and the content of the basic-level mental models associated with the terms--two not unrelated facts. The mental model associated with a term is culturally specific, and is just that structure in terms of which we use that term in our mental life--it would be somewhat misleading just to say it is the knowledge of that term we have, in that typically we do not think of knowledge as a structured yet flexible object. In any event, the conventionality of an analogy will then depend on the particular mental models invoked by the terms it involves, as some mental models will ramify and connect more widely than others--some of this variation being locally specific to a time and place, some being based more deeply in broadly shared experiential phenomena.

Similarly, Turner presents the contrast between the first item below and the next four (226-27). This discussion is part of an argument against E.D.Hirsch's *Dictionary of Cultural Literacy*, wherein the first item appears as an entry. The point is that in that context, any of the other items is just as likely to appear. There is no indication that the first entry is motivated "as something that fits into a conceptual system. . . . [while the]. . . fantasy entries are all ridiculous exactly because they

are arbitrary with respect to our conceptual patterns." Notice that the argument is not that our patterns are the result of familiarity with the real item; rather it is that the real item is the real one because it draws on already existing conceptual resources. The analyst's task, then, is to understand and explicate those resources and how they are invoked here.

> The Grim Reaper: A figure commonly used to represent death. The Grim Reaper is a skeleton or solemn-looking man carrying a scythe, who cuts off people's lives as though he were harvesting grain.
>
> The Starving Shepherd: A figure commonly used to represent Death. The Starving Shepherd is an emaciated basketball player who kills people as is he were standing watch over sheep.
>
> The Jaunty Electrician: A figure commonly used to represent Death. The Jaunty Electrician is a rotund philanthropist who kills people as though he were installing light switches for free.
>
> The Scratching Hemophiliac: A figure commonly used to represent Death. The Scratching Hemophiliac kills people as if he were bleeding while scratching.

Turner explicates the Grim Reaper as follows (RM: 220-222; see also LM: 76-82). There is a basic metaphor "that runs deep and wide throughout our conceptual system." It is "that PEOPLE ARE PLANTS with respect to the life cycle. . . ." A second important general metaphor involved is "EVENTS ARE ACTIONS" which allows us to reconstrue non-agentive happenings as involving agents ("My car decided to strand me this morning" is an example Turner gives). It is this which "enables us to personify." This underlies "our commonplace notion that all individual deaths are the result of Death-in-general: everyone is subject to Death, and particular deaths are caused by Death." Add to this the knowledge that reapers are those who cut down plants and

> . . . we use PEOPLE ARE PLANTS to map, metaphorically, the plant onto the the person and the death of the plant onto the death of the person. We use EVENTS ARE ACTIONS to arrive at a complex mapping in which the action of reaping corresponds to the event of causing a human death, and the Reaper corresponds to Death-in-General.

The task, again, was to understand explicitly why and how we implicitly understand The Grim Reaper, and do it so effortlessly, while, try as we might, we find the alternatives merely absurd. The clues are to be found strewn throughout our language, in everyday and literary uses (for example, Turner cites "She's withering away" "He's a late bloomer", the *Iliad*, *Job*, and Herrick's "To the Virgins, to make much of time" with respect to PEOPLE ARE PLANTS). By

examining such clues, we can come up with hypotheses about the conceptual structures at work in general, and use such hypotheses to explicate the particular cases at hand.

Turner suggests other levels of analysis beyond these "local" investigations of words and imagery at which knowledge of the structure and system in everyday cognition can and should inform more strictly literary inquiries (RM: 149-50; 241-46). One is "the way in which an entire literary work (or even a type of literary work) can be inspired and informed globally by a controlling conceptual connection." He cites, as examples, ". . . journey and self-discovery in the *Odyssey* and . . . conversational wit and sex in *Much Ado about Nothing*." (RM: 149; 241) He also provides something in the way of the beginnings of a case study by examining a stanza of Pound's "Praise of Ysolt" in terms of "our commonplace concepts of *conversation* and *argument*." (RM: 241-42) At another level, Turner suggests that the study of *genre* should be rethought. Genre study is evidently a species of taxonomic study, and given the prototype nature of our concepts and categorization in general, we should expect especially serious implications for any taxonomic inquiry that works with products of the human mind (RM: 150). Finally, Turner proposes that there "is the level at which we conceive of literature generally." (RM: 245) He notes that literature can be framed as a species of *conversation*; reading as *journeying*, and writing as "thinking on paper, and thought as writing in the mind." (RM: 245-46) In all cases, it is only by better understanding the structure and system of everyday cognition that real insight can be gained into the literary concepts and objects connected to and flowing from the everyday.

Turner also sketches an analysis of tense (in English) as an example of how grammatical constructions can be explicated in this framework (LM: 148-54). The core idea is that "tense arises as a grammatical structure by projection of viewpoint and focus." (LM: 153) Behind this is the basic claim that *story* is a fundamental cognitive category and that in story recognition "there is a recognizing agent who has a single spatial focus and a single spatial viewpoint." (LM: 149) In other words, we once more trace back to a domain that is rooted in embodied relations, in this case spatial ones. An agent having a temporal focus and temporal viewpoint arises by means of "projecting the story of perception in space . . . onto the story of perception in time . . . ." (LM: 149; see pp. 118ff. for argument) Since, as a matter of fact, alternative foci and viewpoints are possible in spatial perception, so too are alternative foci and viewpoints possible--indeed

inevitable--in the structured mental spaces which are constructed in story recognition on the basis of spatial perception. But then, when the projection to perception in time is done, these mental spaces, too, will allow for multiple foci and viewpoints. And this is what can "create a rudimentary grammatical system of tense." (LM: 149)

> In English, basically, the grammatical construction of present tense corresponds to the narrative category in which temporal focus and viewpoint are the same; the grammatical construction of past tense corresponds to the narrative category in which the focus precedes the viewpoint; the grammatical construction of future tense (or technically, of verb phrase constructions that we commonly say signify "future tense") corresponds to the narrative category in which the viewpoint precedes the focus. A relative tense such as we find in "I will have run" corresponds to a complex narrative structure in which viewpoint precedes focus, but the focus itself contains a viewpoint that is preceded by it own different focus. (LM: 149)

Turner proposes that his approach, which uses only resources he has argued are needed anyway for other purposes in the general cognitive system, can straightforwardly accommodate examples that more "standard" approaches to tense must take to be unprincipled exceptions. These include, for example, "Who had the roast beef sandwich" said by a waiter; "'John has won the race,' said when John has not yet crossed the finish line"; or "This train goes to Paris" said of a train that will leave the next day "from a station from which no train has previously departed for Paris and no train ever will again . . . ." (LM: 153) Again, the point is that insight and explanation are forthcoming only when extremely close attention is given to a combination of both the details in a particular domain--in this case tense--and the general patterns and structures revealed by the cognitive/linguistic system overall, with the explicit goal of leaving as few of the details as possible unaccounted for.

Another sort of example is the discussion of how "Classic Thought and Classic Language Match" (CST: 67-71). The crucial point made here is that both thought and its expression in language are structured by kinaesthetic image-schemas. Classical style is particularly notable for its success in aligning the image-schema of the thought with the image-schema of the expression; this is what gives it its characteristic appearance of clarity and simplicity, and its unargumentative persuasiveness. "Perhaps the most common image schema used in structuring expression is movement along a directed path from a source to a goal." (CST: 69) This schema also characterizes much thought, giving it "a structure and a direction." (CST: 67) In language, the schema entails

that the end of a sentence is a highly valued position "known as the stress position. . . . [and] Classical style respects the stress position." (CST: 69) Another schema Classical Style often follows in its thought and expression is "focusing-and-then-inspecting." (CST: 70) There are others, too.

> Many of the most familiar image schemas have to do with forces--impinging, pushing, pressuring, stopping, overcoming--especially when these forces are applied by agents in action. A classic thought is often structured by an image schema of action, and the corresponding classic expression mirrors this structure by assimilating the structure of expression to the structure of the action: the subject is an agent and the verb is the action performed by the agent. (CST: 70)

Again, it is the harmony of each of thought and expression with the same basic image-schema, and thus by transitivity with one another, that creates the overall effect of clarity in Classic Style.

Turner's work provides a vision of a unified approach to "inquiry into language and the arts of language . . ." (RM: 16) Though we have really only outlined his sketches of what such a unified inquiry would actually look like--for example, leaving out entirely his speculations about and advertings to work in neuroscience that may give biological support to the project--it does seem tolerably clear how one might proceed in such inquiries. A somewhat different issue, however, is how to use these ideas for the language arts, both in the secondary schools and before. Again, though, it does seem tolerably clear that these ideas can provide the sort of center for the language arts that is currently missing.

Work in the language arts could start with close attention to the details of everyday language, the distribution and meaning of words and constructions as exemplified in cognitive linguistics. This is important work in several ways. It is empirical work, and so grounds students in the doing of inquiry--in hypothesis formation and testing, in argument and evaluation, in theory and model construction--and does so using data which are immediately (and cheaply) available to all. It allows, too, that students and teachers alike may discover things that none of them previously knew about language. Then, too, it fosters an important attitude shift toward language: it is a thing, a potential (and actual) object of inquiry, not merely either a transparent vehicle for expression or a metaphysical marker of self and identity. And on account of the overall view of the relation between language and the mind more generally, this opens the way to a naturalized view of

the mind as also an object with properties that may be discovered and analyzed. In doing such inquiry, of course, one uncovers the underlying organization of the mind, and so, as these are elucidated, they can be applied to more strictly literary examples as well. Insofar as the underlying organization has been revealed, the structures posited will inform the literary analysis. Insofar as the literary examples resist analysis, we have new data that may force revisions and rethinkings of the posited structures. While the everyday expressions may more clearly reveal the structures of mind, they have no in principle privileged status over literary expressions. The language arts, on this view, reveal the unity of language and literature as instances of unity of mind, and all examples of all kinds must ultimately be analyzable.

Writing, too, has a place in this scheme. As discussed above with respect to Classical Style, writing can be usefully analyzed and understood using image-schemata; CST has a number of examples of how writing can be made less comprehensible by misaligning image-schemata. An important part of this view is that ". . . no one can master *writing* because *writing* is too large to be encompassed. It is not one skill; it is not even a small bundle of routine skills." (CST: 12) Writing styles are positions taken with respect to fundamental questions concerning "truth, presentation, scene, cast, and thought and language." (CST: 27) Because they are coherent, systematic entities, styles can be analyzed, taught, and learned.

The language arts need a center. I have suggested that language is that center; in fact, it is not. Or not ultimately--ultimately, the center is ". . . [s]ystematicity, links, connections" (RM: 217). It is these things, the ability to explicitly recognize and create them, that are the mark of true education. Language offers an accessible entry way into the system, links, and connections that are our minds, so it is an appropriate methodological center for the language arts. But it is *methodological*, not metaphysical, not a priori; we should choose it because we *should*, not because we must; because it is an appropriate means to the real and larger end. By discovering, exploring, and manipulating the systematicity, links, and connections that implicitly structure language, and thus our minds, we improve our abilities to explicitly recognize and create systematicity, links, and connections more generally. In so doing, we (can) become more conscious, more capable, more fully human.

Robert Chametzky
rchametz@indiana.edu

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